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By letter of 12 December 1990 the Council consulted the European Parliament, 
pursuant to Article 57 (2) of the EEC Treaty, on the Commission proposal for a 
Council directive relating to the supervision of credit institutions on a 
consolidated basis. 
At the sitting of 21 January 1991 the President of Parliament announced that 
he had referred this proposal to the Committee on Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Citizens' Rights as the committee responsible and to the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy for its opinion. 
At its meeting of 19 September 1990 the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights had appointed Mr BLAK rapporteur. 
At its meeting of 6 February 1991 it considered the Commission proposal and 
working document. At its meetings of 27-28 June 1991, 25-26 September 1991, 
15-16 October 1991 and 29-30-31 October 1991, the Committee considered the 
proposal from the Commission and the draft report. 
At the latter meeting it adopted the draft legislative resolution 
unanimously. 
The fall owing took part in the vote: Graf STAUFFENBERG ( P), VAYSSADE (VP), 
BLAK, rapporteur, BRU PURON, FALCONER, GARCIA AMIGO, GRUND, HOON, Lord 
INGLEWOOD, MEDINA ORTEGA, NAPOLETANO (for BONTEMPI), SALEMA and ZAVVOS. 
The opinion of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial 
Policy is attached. 
The report was tabled on 31 October 1991. 
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
Commission proposal for a Council directive 
on the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis 
(COM(90) 0451 - SYN 306) 
Commission text 1 Amendments 
(Amendment No 1) 
Fourth recital a (new) 
Whereas risks, taken by one or more 
credit institutions, are revealed not 
only in figures shown in 
(consolidated) balance sheets and 
annual accounts but are also subject 
to the manner in which relations 
within groups are organised and the 
relative independence of the 
management of the credit institutions 
involved; 
(Amendment No 2) 
Eight recital 
Whereas until further coordination of 
the own funds requirements against 
market risks has been completed, the 
competent authorities may continue to 
exclude from the scope of consolidated 
supervision those financial 
institutions engaged in activities 
which are principally subject to 
market risks and which are subject to 
particular rules of supervision ; 
Deleted 
(Amendment No 3) 
Ninth recital 
Whereas following the adoption of 
Counci 1 Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 
December 1986 concerning the annual 
accounts and the consolidated accounts 
of banks and other financial 
establishments establishing rules of 
consolidation applicable to 
consolidated accounts published by 
credit institutions, it is possible to 
define more precisely the methods to 
be used in prudent i a 1 superv1 s 1 on 
conducted on a consolidated basis; 
1 OJ C 315, 14.12.1990, p. 15 
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Whereas following the adoption of 
Council Directive 86/635/EEC of 8 
December 1986 concerning the annual 
accounts and the consolidated 
accounts of banks and other financial 
establishments establishing rules (2 
words deleted) applicable to 
consolidated accounts published by 
credit institutions, together with 
the dispositions of Council Directive 
83/349/EEC on consolidated accounts 
it is possible to define more 
precise 1 y the methods to be used in 
prudential supervision conducted on a 
consolidated basis. 
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Commission text Amendments 
(Amendment No 4) 
Ninth recital a (new) 
Whereas consolidation is a measure to 
ensure insight into the strength of a 
group of companies of wh i eh one or 
more credit institutions are part, 
but that national supervision on 
credit institutions on a non 
consolidated basis, will not be 
replaced. 
(Amendment No 5) 
Tenth recital a (new) 
Whereas supervision of credit 
institutions on a consolidated basis 
must be aimed at protection of the 
depositors of the credit 
institutions; 
(Amendment No 6) 
Article 1, second indent 
- "financial institution" means an 
undertaking other than a credit 
institution whose principal activity 
is to acquire and hold participations 
or to exercise one or more of the 
operations included in numbers 2 to 12 
of the Annex to Directive 89/646/EEC; 
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- "financial institution" means an 
undertaking other than a credit 
institution, the principal activity 
of which is to acquire and hold 
holdings or to carry on one or more 
of the activities listed in points 2 
to 12 in the Annex to Directive 
89/646/EEC; 
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Commission text1 Amendments 
(Amendment No 7) 
Article 3(3), fourth indent 
- until further coordination of the 
capital requirements relating to 
market risks, if the financial 
institution in which the participation 
is held is involved in activities 
which are principally subject to 
market risks and it is subject to 
particular rules of supervision; the 
competent authorities may similarly 
exclude from consolidation the trading 
books of credit or financial 
institutions in which there is a 
participation, provided that those 
trading books are subject to special 
rules of supervision. 
Deleted 
(Amendment W 8) 
Article 3, paragraph 3a (new) 
In the case of application of the 
first indent of the third paragraph, 
the competent authorities will 
nevertheless gather the information 
which transfer is allowed; and inform 
the Commission about the limits set 
by a specified non-member country. 
(Amendment No 9) 
Article 3, paragraph 5 
5. Supervision of solvency and control 
of 1 arge exposures of a credit 
institution or a financial holding 
company shall be carried out on a 
consolidated basis in accordance with 
the provisions of the Community acts 
in force. Member States may adopt any 
adjustments necessary to apply these 
acts to financial holding companies. 
When the parent undertaking is a 
credit institution, its submission to 
the limits set in Article 12(1) and 
( 2) of Directive 89/646/EEC must be 
supervised and controlled on a 
consolidated basis. 
e:\wpdoc\docdef\151277.rva - 6 -
5. Supervision of solvency and 
control of large exposures of a 
credit institution or a financial 
holding company shall be carried out 
on a consolidated basis in accordance 
with the provisions of the Community 
acts in force. Member States may 
adopt any adjustments necessary to 
apply these acts to financial holding 
companies. 
The superv1s1on shall include the 
submission to the limits set in 
Article 12(1) and (2) of Directive 
89/646/EEC wh i eh must also be 
supervised and controlled on a 
consolidated basis. 
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Commission text1 Amendments 
(Amendment No 10 
Article 3, paragraph Sa(new) 
Supervision on a consolidated basis 
will also include all figures and 
facts of which knowledge can be 
judged as useful for the aim of the 
quality of supervision on a 
consolidated basis, e.g. the economic 
and financial performance of the 
group. This concerns not only 
financial information but also 
organisation of the business, 
influence exercised by undertakings 
within a group on other undertakings 
and the existence of adequate 
information flows. 
(Amendment No 11) 
Article 3, paragraph 7 
7. Member States may forgo supervision 
on an individual basis of credit 
institutions that, as parent 
undertakings, are subject to 
supervision on a consolidated basis. 
If the competent authorities do 
undertake solo supervision of such 
credit institutions they may, for the 
calculation of own funds, make use of 
the prov1s1on contained in Article 
2(1), third subparagraph of Directive 
89/299/EEC. 
7. Member States may not forgo 
superv1s1on on an individual basis of 
credit i nst it uti ons that, as parent 
undertakings, are subject to 
supervision on a consolidated basis. 
(Amendment No 12) 
Article 5, paragraph 3 
3. In cases of participations other 
than those in paragraphs 1 and 2, or 
where a significant influence is 
exercised in fact, the competent 
authorities shall determine whether 
and how consolidation is to be carried 
out. In particular, they may permit 
or require the equity method to be 
used. 
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3. In cases of participations other 
than those in paragraphs 1 and 2, or 
where a significant influence is 
exercised in fact, the competent 
authorities shall determine how 
con soli dation is to be carried out. 
They may permit that the equity 
method be used where the risk to 
which the shareholder is exposed is 
limited to his investment. 
PE 151.277/FIN 
Or. EN. 
Commission text1 Amendments 
(Amendment No 13) 
Article 8, first paragraph 
The Commission may submit proposals to 
the Council whether at the request of 
a Member State, or on its own 
initiative, in order to negotiate 
agreements with one or more third 
countries with the goal of 
establishing means of applying 
supervision on a consolidated basis 
- to credit institutions having a head 
office in a third country and 
- to credit institutions situated in a 
third country whose parent 
undertaking, whether a credit 
institution or a financial holding 
company, has its head office in the 
Community. 
The Commission may submit proposa 1 s 
for agreements with one or more third 
countries with the goal of 
establishing means of applying 
supervision on a consolidated basis, 
by way of reciprocity: 
- to credit institutions having a 
head office in a third country and 
- to credit institutions situated in 
a third country whose parent 
undertaking, whether a credit 
institution or a financial holding 
company, has its head office in the 
Community. 
(Amendment No 14) 
Article 8 
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Add a fourth paragraph (new) 
The Commission shall, on the basis of 
information received from the Member 
States, from the competent 
authorities or from the credit 
institutions, financial holding 
companies or mixed activity ho 1 d i ng 
companies, examine, with the Advisory 
Committee, the possibility of 
negotiating with one or more third 
country the lifting of the legal 
impediments mentioned in Article 3, 
paragraph 3, first indent. The 
Commission may, thereafter, submit 
proposals subject to the procedures 
of the first paragraph 
(Amendment No 15) 
Article 8 
- 8 -
Add a fifth paragraph (new) 
The Commission shall, every three 
years, draw up a report on the 
application of this directive. 
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DRAFT lEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION 
embodying the op1n1on of the European Parliament on the Commission proposal for 
a Council directive relating to the supervision of credit institutions on a 
consolidated basis 
The European Parliament 
having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(90) 451 
final - SYN 306)(1) , 
having been consulted by the Council pursuant to Article 57(2) of the 
EEC Treaty (C3-0002/91), 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Citizens' Rights and the opinion of the Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A3-0290/91) 
1. Approves the Commission proposal in accordance with the vote thereon; 
2. Calls on the Commission to amend its proposal accordingly, pursuant to 
Article 149(3) of the EEC Treaty; 
3. Asks to be consulted again should the Council intend to make substantial 
modifications to the Commission proposal; 
4. Calls on the Council to incorporate Parliament's amendments in the 
common position that it adopts in accordance with Article 149(2) (a) of 
the EEC Treaty; 
5. Instructs its President to forward this opinion to the Council and 
Commission. 
(1) OJ No. C 315, 14.12.1990, p. 15 
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1. Introduction 
The European common financial market is an essential part of the frontier-free 
single European market, and encompasses not only the free movement of money and 
capital for all citizens but also freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. At the end of the long road to the achievement of this goal, 
the result will be that Community citizens will be free to invest their money, 
open bankaccounts and take out loans and insurance pal icies as and where they 
choose, and banks and insurance companies will be free to offer their financial 
'products' without restriction; securities may be quoted on all stock exchanges 
and issued in all Community countries. A bigger market, which can stand 
comparison with the financial markets of Japan and the United States, more 
competition and less cost are examples of the direct advantages of a financial 
common market. 
The Commission proposal for a directive relating to the superv1s1on of credit 
institutions on a consolidated basis replaces Directive 83/350/EEC on the 
supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis1 . Compared with 
that Directive, the present proposal: 
a. extends supervision on a consolidated basis when the parent undertaking is 
not a credit institution; 
b. specifies the aims of supervision on a consolidated basis; 
c. specifies the consolidation methods. 
It must be remembered that the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision also deals 
with banking supervision in Europe. In September 1990 this Committee published 
a report on international developments in banking supervision, of which Chapter 
VI deals with the implementation of the Basle Concordat of 1975 replaced by the 
1983 Concordat ("Principles for the supervision of banks foreign 
establishments"). Nevertheless, because of certain difficulties which are also 
encountered in the proposed directive, the Basle Committee was unable to reach 
an acceptable solution up to the present date. 
The Commission proposal is welcome, but it must in any case be made certain 
that the stability of the sector and the protection of consumers cannot in any 
way be compromised. The majority of clients of credit institutions are ordinary 
wage-earners who save money which is deposed in banks and financial institutions 
which are ever more international (constituting an extra currency risk), and 
who invest a large proportion of their savings, through their pension-insurances 
companies. Therefore the question of risks must be dealt with so that it is 
possible even for non-experts to judge the risks involved in specific 
investments. 
In the opinion of the rapporteur, this will in the end be profitable for the 
credit institutions, because the creation of a sound financial system and the 
guarantee to all clients and providers of capital will lead to lower funding 
costs. This will more than offset the increased costs in complying with the 
more stringent obligations, and more stringent capital requirements. 
At first sight it is clear that the proposed Directive is too complicated. The 
link-up with other directives is far from clear, and it appears to apply to 
companies which are then excluded from real consolidation, or for wich the 
supervising authorities have the possibility to bring them under consolidation 
requirements, partly or wholy, or can exempt them from consolidation. 
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Extension of the obligation to consolidate 
Under Directive 83/350/EEC, only credit institutions which had a participation 
(25% or more of the capital) in another credit or financial institution were in 
principle subject to supervision of their consolidated financial situation. 
Where a credit institution had a participation of more than 50%, the Member 
State or the competent authorities (determined by the holding company) were 
obliged to require either full or proportional consolidation. For a 
participation of 50% or less, the Member States could determine the method of 
consolidation or (within limits) decide that consolidation was not required. 
The present proposal extends the scope of the directive : 
a) where the parent undertaking is a financial holding company (see 
definition in Article 1 and Article 3 third indent) or a mixed-activity 
holding company with at least one credit institution as subsidiary. For 
mixed activity holdings, Article 6 provides for supplying information, but 
there is no consolidation requested (see Article 1, fourth indent); 
b) where the participations are of 20% or more of the voting rights or 
capital; 
and 
c) by limiting certain of the present exemptions. 
The extension of the scope of the directive does, however, not mean that the 
obligation to provide information on a consolidated basis to the authorities is 
extended in the same way. Consolidation (full consolidation or a proportional 
consolidation in the case of a limited risk) will only be obligatory for 
holdings which are credit institutions or financial institutions, concerning 
credit and financial institutions which are subsidiaries over which the holding 
exercises a dominant influence (Article 5, first paragraph). 
Where only significant influence is exercised, the authorities will be free to 
determine whether or how consolidation is required. (See paragraph 2.3.1. of the 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee). Also, in the opinion of the 
rapporteur, parts of the proposal create a false impression. The Commission 
should improve the text of the proposed directive, and limit the choices for the 
Member States or the Member States' authorities. The problem concerning the 
position of insurance companies should be dealt with within the framework of 
supervision of insurance companies. 
Position of the trading book 
On pages 5 and 6 of the explanatory memorandum, the Commission stresses that 
only "supervision on a group basis provides a complete picture of the market 
risks to which the credit institution(s) belonging to a group are exposed". 
This reasoning can be accepted. Nevertheless, the proposal allows the competent 
authorities to exclude from consolidation specialist financial institutions 
whose activities expose them principally to market risks (Article 3(3), fourth 
indent, first part). These specialist financial institutions seem to be a 
common practice in the United Kingdom, whereas continental banking groups often 
include the comparable activities within their balance sheet. 
This situation has been recognised by the Commission, which, in Article 3(3), 
fourth indent, second part, includes a clause which allows credit institutions 
with the agreement of the competent authorities, to exclude the trading book 
from consolidation, provided that this is subject to special rules of 
supervision, in this case the capital adequacy directive (C.A.D.). 
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With the Economic and Social Committee, 
unrealistic and, from a prudential point 
should enable an overall view of all 
dangerous (market) risks. The technical 
not seem to be convincing. 
the rapporteur deems such an approach 
of view, unreasonable. Consolidation 
the risks and not exclude the more 
problems invoked by the Commission do 
It is of major importance for the stability of the financial system, the 
competitive position of the European banks and for the guarantees to be given to 
private customers, that an acceptable solution be found to this problem. The 
Commission is invited to propose a separate directive which should come in force 
before 1 January 1993. 
Determining consolidation methods 
For the consolidation methods reference is made to Directive 86/635/EEC on the 
annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other financial 
i nst itut ions, whi eh directive refers also to Directive 83/349/EEC on 
consolidated accounts. The methods of consolidation are however not defined. 
During discussions in the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, the 
Commission, on request of the rapporteur, agreed to make use of one term for 
pro-rata consolidation and proportional consolidation. 
It is useful to remember that consolidation will result in information from 
distinct legal entities being included in one figure, and that the resulting 
figures may show the risks less precisely than the information on the individual 
parts of the group. It must be made clear that the supervision on consolidated 
accounts will not affect the superv1s1on of the separate holding company, 
subsidiary or sister company, which companies will remain responsible for their 
own activities. The supervision on a non-consolidated basis must remain for 
stability of the sector and for the protection of the clients. This also applies 
for the holding company,(see Article 3, (7) as amended). 
The directive in relation to other directives in the field of credit 
institutions 
In itself, the proposed directive, which requires a consolidation in more cases 
than the Directive 83/356/EEC, is a relatively technical matter. It was 
mentioned before that supervision on a consolidated basis does not replace 
national supervision on solo companies. 
The impact of the proposed directive must be seen mainly in relation to : 
the directive on solvency ratios for credit institutions 89/647/EEC OJ L 
384 of 30.12.1989 p. 14, 
the directive on the own funds of credit institutions 89/299/EEC, OJ L 124 
of 5.5.1989 p. 162, 
the proposal for a Directive on capital adequacy for investment firms and 
credit institutions COM(90) 141 final - SYN 257. 
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Definition of "financial institution" 
The definition of financial institution in the Directive (Art. 1, second 
indent) differs s 1 i ght 1 y from that used in Art i c 1 e 1, paragraph 6, of the 
Second Banking Directive. This seems unnecessary, since the supervision on a 
consolidated basis is related to· influence. The word "participation" can thus 
be replaced by "holding" as in the Second Banking Directive. 
Specification of supervision 
The directive as proposed is not directed to a real "bookkeeping" consolidation 
as intented by Directives 86/635/EEC and 86/349/EEC (which could in principle 
lead to consolidated accounts that can be published) but it will only lead to 
supervision on some consolidated figures and data. This means that figures 
concerning subsidiaries have to be added~ for some items of supervision. 
The nature of the supervision, set out mainly in Article 3, (5) and (6) 
concerns : 
a. solvency 
b. large exposures 
c. limits of Article 12(1) and (2) of Directive 89/646/EEC (limits to 
holdings in companies other than credit and financial institutions) 
d. internal control mechanisms. 
This, however, is fairly limited: the usual control on the management and 
fi nanc i a 1 and economic performances are not express 1 y mentioned and the term 
"internal control mechanisms" is quite vague. It seems necessary to adjust 
these points (see Amendment 10). 
Legal aspects of the Commission proposal 
The Commission has chosen Article 57(2), first and third sentences of the EEC 
Treaty as the legal basis for the Directive. Article 57(2) was also used as 
legal basis for the 1983-Directive on supervision on a consolidated basis, the 
directive on the own funds of credit institutions, the directive on solvency 
ratios and the Second Banking Directive. The fact that Directive 83/350/EEC is 
expressly repealed with effect from 1 January 1993 (Article 10 of the proposed 
directive) must be welcomed for clarity. 
Nevertheless, it must be said that the directive, with its many references to 
other directives concerning credit institutions, is a part of a whole series of 
measures which should be consolidated. 
As in Directive 83/350/EEC, the proposed directive will only be applicable for 
institutions within the Community. Under Directive 83/350/EEC, institutions in 
third countries could be made subject to consolidation by way of bilateral 
agreements (Article 6 ). It is important to know which agreements exist. 
Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the fact that concerning the 1983 
Directive an amendment was adopted by Parliament which expressly asked the 
Commission to publish a standard text of such an agreement. This has never been 
done. 
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In its explanatory statement of the provision which became Article 6 of the 1983 
Directive, the Commission suggested that bilateral agreements could be replaced 
by agreements between the Community and third countries, which is now proposed 
in Article 8. 
The text of this article, however, leaves open the question of the legal basis 
on which the authority of the Commission to start negotiations will depend. 
Article 57 of the EEC Treaty, used as the legal basis in the proposal for an 
EEC/Switzerl and Agreement on direct insurance other than life assurance (1), 
could also serve as the legal basis for these agreements. One result of 
application of Article 57 would be that Articles 113/116 or 223 EEC Treaty and 
the procedures foreseen by these articles will not be applicable, and that the 
cooperation procedure should continue to apply to such agreements. This 
clarification could also serve to include the notion of reciprocity in the 
exchange of information, which the proposed text leaves open. 
(see Amendment nr. 13) 
Conclusions 
The Commission proposal can be considered as a step towards harmonisation in 
the financial sector, but it must be made certain that the protection of 
clients' interests is not made secondary to the competitiveness of the sector 
in the limited sense of short-term profit. In a long term perspective, the 
stability of the sector, for which a thorough superv1s1on is necessary, will 
lead to better results for the companies as well as for the clients. 
Apart from the amendments proposed, there are a number of subjects which need 
to be covered by a directive and for which the Commission is invited to submit 
proposals : 
1. Consolidation of "trading book" valuables and equal treatment of 
subsidiary companies which deal in or hold securities and independent 
investment firms; 
2. Codification of the different Community measures which are mainly directed 
to the financial sectors. 
(1) see Documents C3-145/89, C3-146/89 and C3-147/89 
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0 P I N I 0 N 
(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy 
for the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights 
Draftsman: Mr HERMAN 
At its meeting of 30 January 1991, the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy appointed Mr HERMAN draftsman. 
At its meetings of 27-28 February and 1 March 1991, 18-20 March 1991 and 
24-25 April 1991 it considered the draft opinion. 
At the last meeting it adopted the amendments annexed to this opinion unopposed 
with 2 abstentions. 
The following were present for the vote: Mr BEUMER, chairman; Mr HERMAN, 
rapporteur; Mr BARTON, Mr BEAZLEY Peter, Mr BERNARD-REYMOND, Mr CASSIDY, 
Mr COONEY (for Mr MERZ), Mr de DONNEA, Mr DE PICCOLLI, Mr HOPPENSTEDT, 
Mrs LULLING, Mr MAHER (for Mr PUNSET I CASALS), Mr MARTINEZ (for Mr MEGRET), Mr 
METTEN, Mrs NIELSEN (for Mr VISENTINI), Mr PAPAYANNAKIS, Mr PATTERSON, 
Mr PINXTEN, Mr PORTO (for Mr COX), Mr RIS~R PEDERSEN, Mr ROTHLEY (for 
Mr FORD), Mr SARIDAKIS (for Mr GALLENZI), Mr SISO CRUELLAS, Mrs TONGUE, 
Mrs VAN HEMELDONCK (for Mr MIHR), Mr WETTIG and Mr von WOGAU. 
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A. Introduction 
This Commission proposal replaces Directive 83/350/EEC(1) with effect from 
1.1.1993 (Art. 10) and aims at "monitoring effectively credit institutions that 
form part of a group". 
The proposed Directive calls for an extension and reinforcement of the 
provisions of the repealed Directive. Hence, in addition, the following shall 
be subjected to supervision on a consolidated basis: 
a) banking groups whose parent undertaking is a "financial holding company" 
(Art. 1, third indent). 
That is to say that an enterprise whose subsidiaries are exclusively or, 
mainly, one or more credit or financial institutions. 
b) a 'mixed-activity holding company' (Article 1, fourth indent). 
That is to say that the parent undertaking of a banking group is neither a 
credit institution nor a financial holding company but it is a 'mixed 
activity'. 
For an efficient reinforcement, the Commission has proposed two improvements 
with respect to Directive 83/350/EEC: 
i ) supervision on a consolidated basis has 
specific supervisory standards (Article 4). 
scale risks and limits on non-financial 
institution and its subsidiaries; 
been enriched by introducing 
There are 1 imits for 1 arge-
holdings held by a credit 
ii) the consolidation methods of Directive 86/635/EEC(2) on the annual accounts 
and consolidated amounts of banks and other financial institutions become 
the relevant rules upon whi eh supervision and control are based. Such 
methods are: full consolidation, proportional consolidation and the equity 
method (Article 5). The status of such consolidation methods is mandatory 
or optional depending on the case. 
B. Content of the proposal 
As far as the Economic Committee is concerned, the proposal in question could 
be assessed upon one simple criterion: Does the proposal enhance competition 
between economic operators which provide similar services? 
One way of answering this question is to probe into the meaning of Article 3. 
As far as paragraphs 1 and 2 are concerned, one finds them acceptable because 
the former is the same as in the Directive 83/350/EEC while the latter improves 
the repealed Directive by introducing an innovation: a financial holding company 
shall be supervised on the basis of its consolidated financial position. This 
is consistent with current practices in ten Member States. France and Portugal 
follow the USA practice of 'individual supervision'. They will have to change 
their financial regulations, if this proposal is adopted. 
Paragraph 3, fourth 
from consolidation 
indent, raises a number of problems. First, it excludes 
financial institutions whose activities expose them to 
(1) OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 18 
(2) OJ L 372, 31.12.1986, p. 1 
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"market risks". Second, it excludes from consolidation the "trading books" of 
credit or financial institutions in which there is participation and are 
subject to special rules of supervision. 
As to the first case of exemption, one has to await agreement on the capita 1 
requirements relating to market risks (i.e. Directive on capital adequacy of 
investment firms and credit institutions - COM(90) 141 - SYN 257) before taking 
a position. This exemption, however, would create the following situation. 
If a 'financial institution' (defined as an undertaking other than a credit 
institution whose principal activity is to acquire and hold participations or 
to exercise activities such as lending, financial leasing, money transmission 
services, portfolio management and advice, etc.) deals with securities that are 
exposed to "market risks", this financial institution will be subject to 
particular rules of supervision and will not be subjected to consolidation. 
This is the case of the Anglo-Saxon system which separates commercial banks 
from investment firms where the· latter are subsidiaries of commercial banks and 
supervised separately; investment firms are not consolidated with the parent 
company. 
If a commercial bank deals with securities in its own right, despite the market 
risks involved in securities, this bank will be subjected to consolidation. 
This is the case of continental Europe with a system consisting of universal 
banks or security houses which are consolidated subsidiaries of banks. 
Such a dual system would result in credit establishments diversifying their 
portfolio in order to avoid consolidation and thus jeopardizing the universal 
banking system. 
The potential for creating distortions of competition is also present because 
unconsolidated subsidiaries such as investment firms are subjected to less 
stringent rules. This has to do with the proposed directive on the capital 
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions which requires these 
institutions to hold own funds in order to cover market risks but are much less 
than the Council Directive 89/299/EEC(l) on own funds of credit institutions. 
In the first case, the Commission proposal would authorise subordinated loans as 
own funds up to 250% of core capital while the Directive 89/299 allows loans up 
to 50%. 
As to the second case of exemption provided for in Article 3(3) fourth indent, 
second part, there is a clause which allows credit or financial institutions to 
exclude from consolidation their 'trading book'. This is a 'free-meal' to the 
continental banking system provided that those trading books are subject to 
special rules of supervision. 
Such an exemption is equa 11 y 
prevention of distortions of 
inappropriate because it does not guarantee the 
competition or preventions of errors in bank 
risks connected with the trading book, which 
would jeopardize the whole idea of supervision on 
supervision. Excluding the 
account for a large portion, 
a consolidated basis. 
Both potential distortions of competitidn are partially remedied if amendment 
No. 4 is accepted. Then, investment undertakings would be subjected to 
consolidation; trading books will not be excluded from consolidation. An 
amendment of this kind does not deal with the complexity of the problem 
(1) OJ L 124, 5.5.1989, p. 16 
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connected with the consolidation of market risks where no international 
agreement exists at present. But this position is supported by the Bas 1 e 
Committee which studies ways and means in order to deal with the consolidation 
of market risks. One way of dealing with market risks is to set the appropriate 
level of own funds requirement under the Commission Directive on capital 
adequacy. 
Article 4 assigns responsibility to competent authorities for exercising 
supervision on a con so 1 i dated basis. The criteria seem to be c 1 ear except in 
the case where a financial holding company established in a Member State has 
its subsidiary credit institutions established in several other Member States. 
Mutua 1 agreement between the competent authorities of all these Member States 
concerned would have to be found. Failing an agreement, paragraph 2 of this 
article provides for subsidiary criteria for assigning responsibility. 
The methods of consolidation are not clearly defined; only a method of 
assessment of the balance sheet for shareholdings in paragraph 2 is stated in 
Article 5. Neither is it made explicit under what conditions full or partial 
consolidation should take place. It might be appropriate to delete the 
reference made to the "equity method" in paragraph 3 because the equity method 
1 imits the consolidated supervision of risky assets of the parent company and 
not of its subsidiaries. Amendment No. 7 seeks to rectify this anomaly and to 
prevent distortions of competition that could arise out of different methods 
used for consolidation. 
Mixed-activity holding companies shall not be subjected to consolidated 
supervision (see Article 6). They shall be required to supply any data or 
information judged to be relevant for the purposes of superv1s1ng credit 
institutions which are subsidiaries of mixed-activity holding companies. This 
provision might not be very con vi ne i ng for preserving fair competition and 
possibly supervision of such companies could be exercised on criteria relevant 
to performance: management, financial and economic. 
C. Amendments 
The proposed amendments are intended to improve the proposal by preventing 
distortions of competition and by clarifying certain aspects relevant to 
supervision on a consolidated basis. 
Amendment No. 1 concerning the definition of "participation" seeks to reinstate 
the percentage of 25% for the inclusion of minority shareholdings in 
consolidated supervision. 
This is consistent with the Commission proposal on the European company which 
lays down voting rights. A follow up of this logic makes amendment No. 6 
necessary. 
Amendment No. 2 is 
specific and links 
banking directive. 
definition a l and makes the scope of the directive more 
it to the operations listed in the Annex of the second 
Amendment No. 3 reinstates the percentage i.e. 2% allowed under the Directive 
83/350/EEC. The competent authorities could exclude from consolidation 
enterprises if their total balance sheet of the credit or financial institution 
in which there is a participation represents less than 2% of the total balance 
sheet or less than ECU 10 million. 
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Amendment No. 4 is important and the fist part of section B of this explanatory 
statement provides its justification. 
Amendment No. 5 corrects a mis-judgement. Article 3{7) allows Member States 
the possibility of two supervisions. Parent firms are subject to supervision 
on a consolidated or even on an individual basis but their subsidiaries are 
supervised on an individual basis. 
Amendment No. 7 takes account of the comments connected with Article 5 of the 
proposal. 
Commission text Amendments 
(Amendment No. 1) 
Article 1, 6th indent 
"participation" means the ownership, 
direct or indirect, of 20% or more of 
the voting rights or capital of an 
undertaking; 
"participation" means the ownership, 
direct or indirect, of 25% or more of 
the voting rights or cap ita 1 of an 
undertaking; 
{Amendment No. 2) 
Article 2 
Scope 
This Directive shall apply to all 
credit institutions, financial holding 
companies and mixed activity ho 1 d i ng 
companies. 
The institutions permanently excluded 
by Article 2 of Directive 77/780/EEC, 
with the exceptions of the central 
banks of the Member States, sha 11 be 
treated as financial institutions for 
the purposes of the Directive. 
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(Amendment No. 3) 
Article 3(3), second indent 
if the enterprise included is, in 
the opinion of the competent 
authorities, of only negligible 
interest in regard to the go a 1 of 
monitoring credit institutions and 
in a 11 cases if the tot a 1 ba 1 ance 
sheet of the credit or financial 
institution in which there is a 
participation represents less than 
the smaller of the following two 
amounts: 1% of the total balance 
sheet of the credit i nst it uti on or 
the financial holding company which 
has the participation or 10 million 
ECU; if several enterprises meet the 
above criteria, they must 
nevertheless be included in the 
consolidation where they 
collectively present a non-
negligible amount with respect to 
the goal alluded to above, or 
- if the enterprise included is, in 
the opinion of the competent 
authorities, of only negligible 
interest in regard to the goal of 
monitoring credit institutions and in 
a 11 cases if the tot a 1 ba 1 ance sheet 
of the credit or financial 
institution in which there is a 
participation represents less than 
the smaller of the following two 
amounts: 2% of the total balance 
sheet of the credit institution or 
the financial holding company which 
has the part i ci pat ion or 10 mi 11 ion 
ECU; if several enterprises meet the 
above criteria, they must 
nevertheless be included in the 
consolidation where they collectively 
present a non-negligible amount with 
respect to the go a 1 a 11 uded to 
above, or 
(Amendment No. 4) 
Article 3(3), fourth indent 
- until further coordination of the 
capital requirements relating to 
market risks, if the financial 
institution in which the 
participation is held is involved 
in activities which are principally 
subject to market risks and it is 
subject to particular rules of 
supervision; the competent 
authorities may similarly exclude 
from consolidation the trading books 
of credit or financial institutions 
in which there is a participation, 
provided that those trading books 
are subject to special rules of 
supervision. 
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7. 
1. 
(Amendment No. 5) 
Article 3(7) 
Member States 
supervision 
basis of 
on an 
credit 
may forgo 
individual 
institutions 
that, as parent undertakings, are 
subject to supervision on a 
consolidated basis. If the 
competent authorities do 
undertake solo supervision of 
such credit institutions they 
may, for the calculation of own 
funds, make use of the provision 
contained in Article 2(1), third 
subparagraph of Directive 
89/299/EEC. 
7.Member States may forgo 
supervision on an individual basis of 
credit institutions that, as parent 
undertakings, are subject to 
supervision on a consolidated basis. 
(Amendment No. 6) 
Article 5(1) 
The competent authorities charged 
with the exercise of supervsion 
on a consolidated basis must, for 
the purposes of supervision, 
require full consolidation of 
credit institutions and financial 
institutions which are 
subsidiaties of the parent 
undertaking or over which the 
latter effectively exercises a 
dominant influence in the opinion 
of the competent authorities. 
This consolidation must ensure 
the supervision on a consolidated 
basis of at least all the 
activities which are included in 
the Annex to Council Directive 
89/646/EEC. 
l.The competent authorities charged 
with the exercise of supervsion on a 
consolidated basis must, for the 
purposes of supervision, require full 
consolidation of credit institutions 
and financial institutions which are 
subsidiaties of the parent 
undertaking or over which the latter 
effectively exercises a dominant 
influence in the opinion of the 
competent authorities. This 
consolidation must ensure the 
supervision on a consolidated basis 
of at least all the activities which 
are included in the Annex to Council 
Directive 89/646/EEC. 
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However, pro-rata consolidation may 
be prescribed in the cases where, in 
the opinion of the competent 
authorities, the responsibility of 
the undertaking holding the 
~articipation is limited to its part 
of the capital, because of the 
responsibilities of other 
shareholders or members whose 
solvency is considered 
satisfactory. The responsibility 
of the other shareholders and 
members must be clearly 
established, if necessary by means 
of formal, shared commitments. 
However, pro-rata consolidation may 
be prescribed in the cases where, in 
the opinion of the competent 
authorities, the responsibility of 
the undertaking holding the 
participation is limited to its part 
of the capita 1, because of the 
responsibilities of other 
s ha reho 1 ders or members whose 
so 1 vency is considered satisfactory. 
The res pons i bil ity of the other 
shareholders and members must be 
clearly established, if necessary by 
means of formal, shared commitments. 
Fully consolidation shall not apply 
in cases of minority participation, 
i.e. of less than 25%. 
(Amendment No. 7) 
Article 5(3) 
3. In case of participations other 
than those in paragraphs 1 and 2, 
or where a significant influence 
is exercised in fact, the 
competent authorities shall 
determine whether and how 
consolidation is to be carried 
out. In particular, they may 
permit or require the equity 
method to be used. 
1. OJ No. L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 18 
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